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labor market outcomes. Here, the results indicate that the policy led to a 10- to 13-
percentage point increase in unemployment. 
 
 
JEL Codes:  H73, J6, R23 
Keywords:  Unemployment protection, migration, mobility, place-based policy, lagging 
regions 
 
 
Jordi Jofre-Monseny 
Universitat de Barcelona & IEB 
Facultat d’Economia i Empresa 
Avda. Diagonal 690 
08034 Barcelona, Spain 
E-mail: jordi.jofre@ub.edu  
 
 
 
                                                 
* I am grateful to comments from Gilles Duranton, Christian Hilber, Mario Jametti, Kurt Schmidheiny, Matthew 
Turner, Javier Vázquez-Grenno and participants at the University of Toronto Urban and Real Estate Day Workshop, 
the II IEB Workshop on Urban Economics, the UEA meetings in Ottawa, the SAEe meetings in Vigo and seminars at 
IdeP (Università della Svizzera Italiana) and SERC (LSE). Funding from grants ECO2010-16934 and 2009SGR102 
is gratefully acknowledged. 
1. Introduction 
There is ample evidence that one unintended consequence of the receipt of unemployment 
benefits is increased unemployment. Katz and Meyer (1990) and Bover et al. (2002), for example, 
document spikes in the probability of exiting unemployment as unemployment benefits near 
expiration in the US and Spain, respectively. Unemployment benefits may distort migration 
decisions, too. First, they can limit the net gains of migrating to areas with better labor market 
conditions. Second, geographical variation in pay can attract welfare prone individuals to areas 
offering higher benefits.  
In this paper, we study the migration effects of a national place-based policy (Sistema 
Integrado de Protección de los Trabajadores Eventuales Agrarios - SIPTEA) that provides greater 
unemployment protection in Extremadura and Andalucía, two lagging regions in southern Spain. 
We focus primarily on migration patterns between 1981 and 1991, a period that coincides with 
the expansion of this program following the victory of the Social Democrats in the 1982 national 
election. In these years, the unemployed of Extremadura and Andalucía were entitled to receive 4.5 
months of the national minimum wage, if they had worked a minimum of 60 days in the 
agricultural sector in the previous year. In 1991, eight percent of the labor force in these two 
regions received this unemployment benefit. In addition, the program also provided many (albeit 
short-term) jobs in local infrastructure projects which could, in turn, be used to fulfill the 60-day 
work requirement. 
SIPTEA creates a geographic discontinuity in unemployment protection that, coupled 
with municipality level data drawn from the 1981 and 1991 population censuses, can be used to 
estimate the mobility effects of the policy. Specifically, we compare migration outcomes of 
treated vs. control municipalities lying along the policy border. These municipalities are rural, 
suffer high unemployment rates and experience high population losses – in our sample of border 
municipalities, the average unemployment rate in 1991 was 25 percent and the average 1981-91 
decennial population growth rate was -15 percent. Hence, we estimate the extent to which greater 
unemployment protection can mitigate out-migration and population losses in lagging rural areas. 
We find that SIPTEA reduced the negative population growth rate between 1981 and 
1991 by three percentage points. The effect is explained both by a decrease in out-migration and 
by an increase in in-migration. Although the data indicate that small flows of cross-border 
migrants do exist, returned migrants from non-border regions account for most of the increase in 
in-migration. Reassuringly, the estimated effects are strongest for the demographic group with 
the lowest levels of educational attainment and, thus, the highest probability of being recipients 
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of unemployment benefits. Moreover, panel data estimates suggest that the results are not driven 
by the presence of time-invariant confounding factors. Our examination of the effects of 
SIPTEA on labor market outcomes indicates that the policy caused a large increase in 
unemployment of between 10 and 13 percentage points. The effect is similar for males and 
females although the mechanisms differ starkly. While the increase in male unemployment is fully 
explained by a decrease in the employment rate, the effect for females is driven by an increase in 
the participation rate. 
Earlier empirical studies have analyzed the effect of unemployment benefits on mobility, 
and include papers that have examined the probability that those that are unemployed will 
migrate. Using US data, Goss and Paul (1990) conclude that receiving unemployment benefits 
decreases the probability of migrating. The same conclusion has been reached by Antolín and 
Bover (1997) and De la Roca (2013) using micro data from Spain. 
Other studies have analyzed whether or not generous unemployment benefits attract 
welfare prone individuals in fiscally decentralized settings. Most US applications, including 
Gelbach (2004) and McKinnish (2005, 2007), focus on interstate differentials in the generosity of 
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program1. Using data from the 1980 and 
1990 censuses, Gelbach (2004) performs a ‘difference-in-differences’ analysis by comparing poor 
single mothers to suitable control groups, noting that the effect of welfare benefit generosity on 
migration gains is a function of children’s ages. For the 1980 census sample, the author finds that 
the probability of out-migration decreases with welfare generosity more markedly among the 
poor single mothers than it does among the controls. The results for 1990 are less conclusive. 
McKinnish (2005) focuses on short-distance moves between counties at state borders. If 
geographic distance reflects mobility costs, out-migration from low-benefit (AFDC) states should 
be higher in border counties than it is in interior counties. The pattern is confirmed but the 
implied effects are small. In a follow-up paper, McKinnish (2007) combines this ‘border’ 
approach with the ‘difference-in-differences’ analysis used in Gelbach (2004). The results of this 
‘triple-differences’ model confirm that AFDC causes a (modest) reduction in out-migration. 
Studies conducted outside the US include Edmark (2009), De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) and 
Fiva (2009). Edmark analyzes the introduction of stricter rules for receiving welfare benefits in 
Stockholm, but finds no effect on out-migration rates. De Giorgi and Pellizzari examine the 
migration decisions of non-EU migrants, focusing on welfare generosity as a factor determining 
destination choices across EU countries. Their results indicate that, conditional on moving, more 
                                                 
1 Earlier studies include Enchautegui (1997) and Levine and Zimmerman (1999). 
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generous benefits may act as a magnet. Fiva tests whether Norwegian municipalities offering 
more generous welfare benefits attract welfare recipients. He finds a substantial effect and 
stresses the need to account for policy endogeneity. 
To the best of our knowledge, however, this is the first evaluation of the effects on 
mobility of a large place-based policy that increases unemployment protection in an area 
characterized by high unemployment and significant out-migration flows and population losses. 
Methodologically, this paper is similar to McKinnish’s (2005, 2007) in that it uses geographic 
discontinuities in unemployment protection to provide credible estimates of the effects of 
interest2. Since AFDC targets poor, single mothers with children, the literature examining this 
program is concerned with the mobility of a specific population group, i.e., poor single mothers. 
This paper complements this US literature by examining a more general unemployment benefit 
that, in contrast to AFDC, can be accumulated over the entire lifecycle.  
This paper is also related to studies dealing with the effects of public policy on the 
location of economic activity. Blanchard and Katz (1992), Decressin and Fatas (1995) and Jimeno 
and Bentolila (1998) study the dynamic adjustments that follow regional economic shocks. In 
contrast to results for the US reported in Blanchard and Katz (1992), Decressin and Fatas (1995) 
and Jimeno and Bentolila (1998) conclude that migration does not play a prominent role in the 
adjustment processes of the typical European and Spanish region, respectively. One hypothesis 
forwarded is that the larger public sectors in the European economies might mute migration 
responses. Using a spatial equilibrium framework, Albouy (2009) studies the effect of federal 
income taxes on the location of economic activities across the US. Since higher wages in more 
productive cities partly offset higher costs of living, taxing nominal income generates uneven tax 
burdens across US cities. Simulation results indicate that federal income taxes reduce long-run 
employment in high-wage areas by 13 percent. 
Following on from this introduction, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. In 
section 2 we describe SIPTEA and unemployment benefits in Spain in depth. Section 3 presents 
the main econometric specifications and Section 4 describes the data and the variables used. 
Section 5 presents and discusses the econometric results and Section 6 provides a summary and 
some concluding remarks. 
                                                 
2 Lalive (2008) uses a ‘border’ approach to study the effects of unemployment insurance on 
unemployment in Austria. A reform temporarily extended insurance pay to workers aged 50 or more in 
some regions. This reform is not likely to affect mobility because workers would need to move well in 
advance of their eventual layoff and, therefore, it is well suited to study the effects of unemployment 
insurance on unemployment. 
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 2. Institutional background 
Description of SIPTEA: In Spain, the agrarian unemployment benefit (or subsidio agrario) has been 
available exclusively to residents of Extremadura and Andalucía since 1984. The benefit forms part 
of a broader national policy (Sistema Integrado de Protección de los Trabajadores Eventuales Agrarios - 
SIPTEA) that seeks to protect the temporary agricultural workers of these two southern regions. 
Besides unemployment benefit, SIPTEA includes a program that hires local population for 
(minor) infrastructure projects (Plan de Empleo Rural)3. Map 1 shows the location of Extremadura 
and Andalucía within Spain. The bordering regions are Castilla-León, Castilla-la Mancha and Región de 
Murcia. 
[Insert Map 1 here] 
The agrarian unemployment benefit (henceforth, Agrarian UB) is only available to 
workers who, being resident in a municipality of Extremadura and Andalucía, are in the Special 
Agrarian Regime of Spain’s Social Security. Between 1984 and 1990, workers in the agricultural 
sector that had been employed for a minimum of 60 days in a given year were entitled to receive 
the subsidy the following year, provided their total income was below the minimum wage4. The 
yearly subsidy corresponded to 4.5 months of the national minimum wage and as of 1985 a 
payment of 2.5 months of the minimum wage was introduced for workers that had been 
employed for between 10 and 60 days. In 1991, 8 percent of the labor force in Extremadura and 
Andalucía received the Agrarian UB. 
The Plan de Empleo Rural (PER) consists of ear-marked grants that flow from the Spanish 
Unemployment Office to municipalities in the rural areas of Extremadura and Andalucía with high 
unemployment rates. In 1987, a total of 237,700 jobs were included in this program. On average 
each infrastructure project provided 30 jobs with a typical duration of less than a month. The 
days worked on these projects could be used by workers to fulfill the requirements of the 
minimum number of days worked, thus making them eligible to receive the Agrarian UB. In 
                                                 
3 SIPTEA includes a third program that offers short training courses (between 60 and 90 days) with the 
objective of providing agricultural workers with the necessary skills to become employable in other sectors 
(Formación Ocupacional Rural). Spending in this third program amounts to roughly 4 percent of the total 
SIPTEA budget (González, 1990). 
4 Days worked in agriculture elsewhere in Spain or abroad can be used to fulfill this minimum 60-day 
requirement. From 1991 onwards, the low personal income requirement (income below minimum wage) 
was replaced by a household requirement (mean household income below minimum wage). At the same 
time, pay became age-dependent with more generous benefits for older claimants. For those aged 60 or 
more, the subsidy was as high as 7.5 months of the minimum wage. 
5
practice, and in addition to providing jobs, the objective of the PER has been to qualify its 
workers for the Agrarian UB (González, 1990). In terms of eligibility, the law stipulates that local 
unemployed agricultural workers resident in Extremadura or Andalucía should be given priority.  
SIPTEA was introduced in 1984, replacing the Empleo Comunitario (EC) program that had 
been in operation since 1971. The EC program hired workers for infrastructure projects as a 
means of providing the unemployed of the rural areas of Extremadura and Andalucía with income. 
However, these projects were often fictitious, so that the program was, de facto, partly a form of 
unemployment benefit (González, 1990). The 1984 reform separated the benefit (i.e. the Agrarian 
UB) from the program for hiring workers for infrastructure projects (PER). The solid line in 
Graph 1 shows the evolution in (1) the number of workers on the EC program between 1979 
and 1983 and (2) the number of recipients of the Agrarian UB between 1984 and 2000. The 
number of workers on the EC program had increased slowly during the 70s but grew sharply in 
the early 80s, rising from 53 thousand in 1981 to 159 thousand in 1983. In 1984, the first year of 
the Agrarian UB, 192 thousand workers received payments, a number that was to increase to 
roughly 295 thousand in 1989 and 19905. The figure then fell to 236 thousand in 1991 and 
remained at that order of magnitude throughout the 90s6. 
The expansion of the program coincided with the victory of the Social Democrats at the 
1982 national election which saw a left-wing government take office for the first time in 46 years. 
Indeed, the timing of the program seems to have responded more to the party’s political agenda 
(Felipe González, Prime Minister, and Alfonso Guerra, Deputy Prime Minister, both being native 
to Andalucía) than to asymmetric economic shocks7. Graph 2 shows the evolution in the number 
of workers on the two schemes and in the rates of unemployment of both the treated regions 
(Extremadura and Andalucía) and the neighboring untreated regions (Castilla-León, Castilla-la 
Mancha and Región de Murcia) between 1977 and 1995. Although the unemployment rate in the 
treated regions was higher for the whole period, the pre-policy trends in both groups of regions 
seem to be common.  
                                                 
5 Strictly speaking, this is the number of recipients in any given month (12 month average) and as such 
underestimates the total number of individuals receiving the benefit in a given year. In 2001, the latter was 
37 percent higher than the former (García-Pérez, 2004). 
6 The fall in the number of recipients between 1990 and 1991 coincides with a huge dip (43 percent 
decrease) in the aggregate number of days worked by individuals within the Special Agrarian Regime of 
Spain’s Social Security. In fact, a drought in 1994 forced the government to reduce the minimum number 
of days worked to 45 (Corzo, 2002). 
7 Curto-Grau (2013) examines whether the introduction of SIPTEA increased the Social Democrats’ share 
of the vote in subsequent national elections. 
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[Insert Graph 1 here] 
[Insert Graph 2 here] 
During the period studied here, there are indications that a significant proportion of the 
Agrarian UB recipients were not, in fact, genuine agricultural workers. A fraudulent practice 
involved the assigning of days of work to relatives so as to maximize the unemployment benefits 
received at the household level (Cansino, 2000). This practice would seem to have been 
quantitatively significant. The dashed and dotted lines in Graph 1 show the evolution over time 
in the number of male and female recipients. While the number of male recipients fell by 32 
percent between 1984 and 1991, the number of female recipients almost quintupled. In fact, as of 
1991, there were more females than males covered by the program. However, this change in the 
gender profile of the recipient does not coincide with a change in the profile of the agricultural 
worker in the regions of Extremadura and Andalucía. According to the Labor Force Survey, the 
ratio of male to female agricultural workers in these two regions was around 1 to 7 both in 1984 
and in 1991. Furthermore, the number of recipients of the Agrarian UB has systematically 
exceeded the Labor Force Survey figure for the number of unemployed agricultural workers in 
Extremadura and Andalucía. In 1991, the number of unemployed agricultural workers stood at 
159,850 compared to a total of 236,327 Agrarian UB recipients8. Finally, Cansino (2000) and 
García-Pérez (2004) have looked at the distribution of the number of days worked by the 
recipients and find a spike at the point representing the minimum number of days worked 
requirement. 
Overall, SIPTEA increased the income of (some) individuals and households in the rural 
areas of Extremadura and Andalucía by providing (1) jobs in the PER projects and (2) Agrarian 
UB. Below, we analyze the extent to which individuals and households responded to these 
incentives. Census data prior to 1981 are not available at the municipal level and so we draw 
mainly on data from the 1981 and 1991 Population Censuses. Specifically, we focus on 
migrations taking place between 1981 and 1991, a period that coincides with the program’s 
expansion. Although the policy is still operative, we do not examine migration patterns between 
1991 and 2001 because a 1996 reform extended the PER program to parts of other Spanish 
regions. 
 
                                                 
8 This figure is the number of unemployed in the agriculture sector averaged across the four quarters of 
1991. 
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Unemployment benefits in Spain: As in most European countries, there are two broad types of 
unemployment benefit in Spain: unemployment insurance (UI) and unemployment assistance9. 
Unemployment insurance is more generous and more closely linked to each worker’s past 
contributions. As for unemployment assistance, there are two programs: the Agrarian UB 
described above (only available to the residents of Extremadura and Andalucía) and the national 
unemployment assistance program (UA). 
In 1991, a worker with a tenure exceeding six months who was subsequently laid off was 
entitled to unemployment insurance for half of period of tenure (to a maximum of two years). 
Insurance pay was proportional to past wages (with certain caps) and this proportion was reduced 
over time from 80 to 60 percent. As for the UA, there were typically two instances in which a 
laid-off worker was entitled to this less generous form of benefit. The first instance arose when 
the worker had a tenure of between 3 and 6 months. In that case, the unemployed worker 
received 75 percent of the minimum wage for a period equivalent to that of his or her tenure. 
This meant that a worker with tenure of between 3 and 6 months received benefits amounting to 
2.25 to 4.5 months of the minimum wage. The second instance in which a worker was entitled to 
unemployment assistance arose when he or she was no longer entitled to unemployment 
insurance. This only applied to workers aged 45 or more with family dependents. The duration of 
these benefits ranged from 18 to 36 months and the pay was 75/100/125 percent of the 
minimum wage for individuals with 1/2/3 dependents. 
In our period of interest, the Agrarian UB was more generous than the UA. Whereas 
under the Agrarian UB scheme a worker needed to have worked for 60 days to be entitled to 4.5 
months of the minimum wage, under the UA program a worker needed to have worked for 6 
months to receive that same amount. Similarly, whereas under the UA program a worker needed 
to have worked for a minimum of 3 months to receive some benefit (2.25 months of the 
minimum wage), under the Agrarian UB scheme a worker only needed to have worked for 10 
days to receive a slightly higher amount (2.5 months of the minimum wage). Moreover, days 
worked on the numerous PER projects could be used to fulfill the minimum number of days that 
gave access to the Agrarian UB. 
In Spain, the number of individuals receiving UI, UA and the Agrarian UB were 616, 575 
and 236 thousand, respectively, in 1991. In Extremadura and Andalucía alone, 108 and 153 
                                                 
9 For a summary of unemployment benefit reforms in Spain between 1987 and 1994, see Bover et al. 
(2002). In Spain, unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance are referred to as ‘prestación 
contributiva’ and ‘prestación asistencial’, respectively. 
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thousand individuals received UI and UA, respectively, in that same year. Notice that all 236 
thousand recipients of the Agrarian UB benefits lived in these two regions, and therefore, 
SIPTEA seems to have significantly increased unemployment protection. The first two rows in 
Table 1 show the fraction of the unemployed that received UI, UA and the Agrarian UB in the 
treated regions and in the untreated neighboring regions of Castilla-León, Castilla-la Mancha and 
Región de Murcia. 
  [Insert Table 1 here]  
The proportion of unemployed receiving UI was 0.15 in the treated regions (Extremadura 
and Andalucía) and 0.21 in the neighboring regions. As for UA, the corresponding figures were 
similar (0.21 vs. 0.23). Since 32 percent of the unemployed in the treated regions received the 
Agrarian UB, the fraction of the unemployed receiving some form of unemployment assistance 
(UA or the Agrarian UB) was much higher in the treated than in the neighboring regions (0.53 vs. 
0.23). These figures are 0.68 and 0.44 if we consider all unemployment benefits together. In the 
last two rows of the Table we focus on ‘border’ provinces (see panel B in Map 1). Here, the 
figures are even starker as 41 percent of the unemployed in the treated provinces received the 
Agrarian UB. As a result, 0.64 and 0.26 of the unemployed received some form of unemployment 
assistance in the treated vs. the neighboring provinces (0.79 and 0.48 considering all types of 
unemployment benefit). Overall, the results in Table 1 seem to indicate that SIPTEA generated a 
substantial change in unemployment protection. 
 
3. Econometric specification 
Our main outcome of interest in this paper is the population growth rate (or related measures 
such as the probability of staying and the in-migration rate) for the period 1981-91. The baseline 
econometric specification is: 
iiii εδxSIPTEAβy +′+⋅= 8191−81                     (1) 
where 91−81iy  is the population growth rate, the probability of staying or the in-migration rate in 
the period 1981-91 in municipality i. The explanatory variable of interest, SIPTEAi, indicates if 
the policy aimed at protecting temporary agricultural workers was operative in municipality i. 
Since this national policy was only implemented in the regions of Extremadura and Andalucía, the 
variable SIPTEAi takes a value of one only if the municipality belongs to either of these two 
southern regions. The error term iε  reflects population growth shocks over the decade spanning 
9
1981-91. We introduce, as control variables, pre-determined municipality characteristics that 
might affect subsequent population growth ( 81′ix ). We also study the effects of SIPTEA on 
unemployment. Here, the baseline specification is: 
iiii υλzSIPTEAφu +′+⋅= 9191                           (2) 
where 91iu is the unemployment rate in municipality i in 1991 and iυ  is the corresponding error 
term. In some specifications, we control for contemporaneous municipal characteristics ( 91′iz ) 
with the potential of affecting unemployment in the municipality. 
Following Holmes (1998) and Black (1999), we choose neighboring municipalities that are 
on opposite sides of the SIPTEA regional border as our treatment and control groups. This 
identification strategy is appealing because it controls for confounding unobservables that evolve 
smoothly over space. We operationalize this strategy by estimating equations (1) and (2) with 
municipalities that are sufficiently close to the policy border. That is: 
  iiii εδxSIPTEAβy +′+⋅= 8191−81      with dbdbi ≤                    (3) 
  iiii υλzSIPTEAφu +′+⋅= 9191          with dbdbi ≤                    (4) 
where dbi is the distance from municipality i to the SIPTEA border and db  is a threshold distance 
that we fix alternatively at 15, 20 and 25 km. The distance from municipality i to the SIPTEA 
border is computed as the air distance between the center of municipality i and the closest 
municipality center on the other side of the border10.  
 
4. Data and variables 
Data: We draw primarily on data from the 1991 Population and Housing Census. This census 
provides a rich data set at the individual level including information about age, gender, 
municipality of residence in 1991 and 1981, level of educational attainment and labor market 
status (employed, unemployed, and non-participant). Unfortunately, municipal data at the 
individual-level that are relevant to this study are not available to researchers11. However, we do 
                                                 
10 An alternative distance is that measured by road, which is a better proxy for transport or mobility costs. 
However, in this application, we are interested in municipalities that are close in terms of confounding 
unobservables which determine mobility (and unemployment) in rural areas. In this respect, plain 
geographic distance seems a more natural metric. 
11 Public-use microdata files for a 10 percent sample of the population in each municipality exceeding 20 
thousand inhabitants and for the population in each province that lives in a municipality with fewer than 
20 thousand inhabitants are available. Unfortunately, the municipality of residence is not reported for 
individuals living in municipalities with fewer than 20 thousand inhabitants. 
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have access to data concerning relevant municipality characteristics such as the number of 
inhabitants by age group, by gender, by labor market status and by level of educational 
attainment. We also know the number of individuals in 1991 that were already living in the 
municipality in 1981 and the number of in-migrants that arrived between 1981 and 1991 by 
region of origin. Furthermore, we know the number of individuals in each of these migration 
categories by labor market status and by level of educational attainment. We also draw on some 
labor market status and mobility data from the 1981 Population and Housing Census. We merge 
these data on the socio-economic characteristics of the population with non-agricultural 
employment data from the 1980 and 1970 Censuses of Establishments and with agricultural 
employment data from the 1982 and 1989 Agrarian Censuses. 
Setting bandwidths of 15, 20 and 25 km in equations (3) and (4) gives us estimation 
samples of 184, 236 and 306 ‘border’ municipalities, respectively. In Table 2 we provide summary 
statistics for the 236 municipalities that lie within 20 km of a relevant border. The SIPTEA 
program was operative in 40 percent of these 236 municipalities, which are relatively small with a 
mean of 1,943 and a median of 754 inhabitants. The municipalities in our sample experience, on 
average, substantial population losses, with an average negative population growth rate of 15.5 
percent over the decade 1981 to 1991. This figure does not differ greatly from -12.7 percent, 
which is the average rate of municipal population growth in the regions lying along the SIPTEA 
border (i.e. Extremadura, Andalucía, Castilla-León, Castilla-la Mancha and Región de Murcia). This 
negative growth contrasts with a contemporaneous increase (3.1 percent) in the aggregate 
population of this group of regions. These two figures can be explained by the intensity of 
intraregional migration flows from rural to urban municipalities12. For the municipalities in the 
top population quartile in 1981, the aggregate population growth over the subsequent decade was 
5.1 percent, while it was -9.2 for the municipalities in the other three quartiles. Besides losing 
population over the 80s, the average municipality in the sample is one in which the 1991 
unemployment rate was high (24.3 percent) and the level of education was low. In that same year, 
only 3.7 percent of 16- to 64-year-olds had completed tertiary education whereas 34 percent had 
fewer than five years of education. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
                                                 
12 See Bover and Arellano (2002) for a study of the personal and location determinants of Spain’s 
intraregional migrations over the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Mobility outcomes 1981-91: The population growth rate between 1981 and 1991 is the first mobility 
outcome that we consider. Abstracting from mortality and birth rates, we focus on out- and in- 
migration flows as the sources of population growth. Specifically: 
81
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We define the probability of staying as the number of individuals aged 16 to 64 in 
municipality i in 1991 that lived in that same municipality in 1981, divided by the population level 
in 1981. Analogously, the in-migration rate is defined as the number of individuals aged 16 to 64 
in municipality i in 1991 that lived somewhere else in 1981, relative to the population level in 
1981. Panel A in Graph 3 plots the 1981-91 population growth of the municipalities in provinces 
that are contiguous to the SIPTEA border (see panel B in Map 1). These municipalities are sorted 
by distance to the policy border where treated municipalities are assigned positive values. The 
dots are averages for rank percentile bins, each representing 40 observations, while the solid lines 
are local linear regression fits estimated separately on either side of the border. Panels B and C 
show the corresponding plots for the probability of staying and the in-migration rate outcomes. 
   [Insert Graph 3 here] 
Panel A shows that, on average, municipalities experienced negative population growth rates 
on both sides of the border. However, population losses were smaller in the treated 
municipalities than they were in the controls (-15 vs. -20 percent). Inspection of panels B and C, 
respectively, shows that a higher probability of staying and a higher rate of in-migration would 
appear to account for this difference. The fact that mobility outcomes evolve discontinuously at 
the SIPTEA border suggests that this policy might have affected migration decisions.  
 
Baseline municipality characteristics in 1981: The border identification strategy that we use is appealing 
because the estimates of interest will be robust to unobservables that evolve smoothly over space. 
In order to assess the meaningfulness of this approach in this application, we examine whether 
observable baseline municipality characteristics that might affect subsequent mobility decisions 
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evolve smoothly at the border. Ideally, we would like these confounding observables to be pre-
determined and, thus, to be measured before 1971 (the year Empleo Comunitario was introduced). 
Unfortunately, for most of the variables that are relevant to us, the first data available are drawn 
from different censuses conducted around 1981. With this caveat in mind and given that the 
program expanded dramatically between 1981 and 1991, we still believe it to be an interesting 
exercise to examine relevant municipality characteristics in 1981, i.e. 81′ix . 
In order to determine whether there is a discontinuity in physical conditions for 
agriculture at the border, panel A in Graph 4 plots the index constructed by Goerlich-Gisbert 
and Cantarino-Martí (2010) that measures the ruggedness of terrain. Municipalities that are close 
to the border have a more rugged relief than those located further from it, suggesting that the 
provincial borders were not randomly fixed in 183313. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the 
physical conditions for agriculture change discontinuously at the border. Panel B examines 
agricultural employment levels by drawing on data from the 1982 Agrarian Census and dividing 
the number of full-time equivalent jobs in agriculture (including days worked by owners and their 
relatives) by the 1981 population level. The importance of agriculture can be seen to increase as 
the border is approached indicating that our average municipality is prominently rural. However, 
there is no clear indication of a discontinuity. Panels C and D examine the behavior of 
employment in the industry and services sectors. Both employment levels, constructed using the 
1980 Census of Establishments, are expressed relative to the 1981 population level. Although 
employment in services seems to increase at the border, no clear evidence of a significant 
discontinuity in these variables is observed. As described earlier, the Labor Force Survey (see 
Graph 2) indicates that treated and control regions had similar pre-policy trends in 
unemployment, albeit that their absolute levels differed. In Panel E we examine whether these 
differences in unemployment persist at the border. To that end, we use unemployment data at 
the municipality level from the 1981 Population and Housing Census. As expected, 
unemployment is higher on average in treated municipalities than it is in the controls. However, 
as we move closer to the SIPTEA border, the unemployment differential shrinks. In fact, the 
‘bin’ averages suggest a smooth evolution of unemployment at the border. Overall, the 
municipality characteristics analyzed here suggest that economic conditions do not change 
abruptly at the SIPTEA border. 
                                                 
13 The (seventeen) Spanish regions (Comunidades Autónomas) were created between 1979 and 1981, just after 
the Constitution was passed in 1978. These regions were constructed as aggregations of provinces created 
back in 1833. Therefore, regional borders, which in turn determine the geographical scope of SIPTEA, 
could not have been defined to reflect current economic conditions. 
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We now turn to examine features related to the concentration of agricultural property, 
which are known to vary across Spain. In the north, farm land is partitioned in small family-
owned estates; in the south, large estates (latifundios) employing temporary seasonal workers with 
no land of their own predominate. Panel F plots the proportion of land on estates with more 
than 200 ha, whereas panel G shows the share of temporary employees engaged in agriculture 
(measured in terms of full-time equivalent jobs). On average, the prevalence of land belonging to  
‘large’ estates is higher on the treated side, but this difference disappears at the border. In 
contrast, the importance of temporary agricultural work increases abruptly at the border – the 
share of employees in temporary jobs increases by more than 10 percentage points. Finally, and 
possibly in relation to the concentration of property, the distribution of population in rural areas 
also evolves with latitude. The population in the rural areas to the north tends to be more 
scattered, residing in smaller settlements, while in the south it tends to concentrate in fewer but 
larger municipalities. Panel H examines population size in 1981 and shows that municipalities are 
larger on the treated side of the border. Hence, and in contrast to the general economic 
conditions examined above, the prevalence of temporary work and population size are, on 
average, higher on the treated side of the border. Our general strategy is to include these variables 
as controls given that their omission might confound the estimates of interest. 
[Insert Graph 4] 
Unemployment in 1991: Besides analyzing the migration effects of SIPTEA, we also explore the 
effects of the program on the unemployment rate in 1991. Panel D in Graph 3 shows municipal 
unemployment rates as taken from the 1991 Population and Housing Census. The 
unemployment rate increases discontinuously at the SIPTEA border, being around 35 and 20 
percent on the treated and control sides, respectively. Notice that this data pattern for 1991 
contrasts with the much smoother evolution presented by this variable ten years earlier (see panel 
E in Graph 4), suggesting that SIPTEA might have increased unemployment significantly. The 
aggregate year-to-year changes in the unemployment rate of treated and control regions in Graph 
2 points in the same direction. While the 1975-1983 trends in unemployment were similar for 
treated and control regions, the introduction of SIPTEA is associated with a greater increase in 
unemployment in Extremadura and Andalucía. 
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5. Results 
Baseline results: The baseline regression results of the effect of SIPTEA on mobility 
(corresponding to equation 3) are presented in panels A to C in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2, 3 and 
4, and 5 and 6 report the results for municipalities that are respectively within 15, 20 and 25 km 
of the relevant border. Columns 1, 3, and 5 only include regional border fixed effects (i.e. 
Extremadura×Castilla-León, Extremadura×Castilla-la Mancha, Andalucía×Castilla-la Mancha, and 
Andalucía×Región de Murcia). Columns 2, 4, and 6 include additionally the baseline municipality 
characteristics described above ( 81′ix ), namely, a terrain ruggedness index, agricultural 
employment in 1982, employment levels in the industrial and services sectors in 1980, the 
unemployment rate in 1981, the proportion of agricultural land on estates with more than 200 ha, 
the share of temporary agricultural jobs in 1982, and the (logged) population size in 1981. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 Turning first to the specifications that only contain the regional border fixed effects as 
control variables, our regression results are closely aligned with the data plots presented in Graph 
3. The 20-km bandwidth results presented in column 3 imply that SIPTEA increased population 
growth by 5.1 percentage points, raised the probability of staying by 4.0 percentage points and 
increased the in-migration rate by 1.3 percentage points. The inclusion of the baseline 
municipality characteristics significantly reduces the policy estimates with regards to population 
growth and the probability of staying outcomes. Thus, according to the 20-km sample estimates, 
conditioning on baseline municipal characteristics reduces the policy estimates on the population 
growth rate and the probability of staying to 2.8 and 2.0 percentage points, respectively14. The 
same patterns emerge for the other bandwidth specifications shown in columns 1 and 2, and 5 
and 6. Overall, the results indicate that SIPTEA did affect mobility, although the implied effects 
are modest. Note that a 2.8-percentage point increase in the population growth rate is equivalent 
to 0.18 and 0.22 of the variable’s mean and standard deviation, respectively. 
Panel D reports the results on unemployment (corresponding to equation 4). Besides the 
regional border fixed effects, columns 2, 4, and 6 further include, as control variables ( 91′iz ), the 
ruggedness index, agricultural employment per 100 inhabitants in 1989, the share of temporary 
agricultural jobs in 1989, the employment levels in the industrial and services sectors per 100 
                                                 
14 As expected, the divergence in results between the specification with and without controls is driven by 
the introduction of the control variables that evolve discontinuously at the border, namely, the share of 
temporary agricultural employment and the baseline (logged) population level. 
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inhabitants in 1990 and the (logged) population level in 1991. Here, the inclusion of the controls 
only results in a slight decrease in the estimates of interest. These estimates imply that SIPTEA 
increased the unemployment rate by roughly 13 percentage points. This large increase in 
unemployment is of a similar magnitude to that implied by Graph 3 (panel D).  
 In Table A1, deferred to the annex, we present a series of placebo estimates of equations 
(3) and (4). Columns 1 to 3 correspond to specifications with bandwidths of 15, 20 and 25 km 
respectively in which the policy border has been moved 15, 20 and 25 km to the north. Thus, in 
these specifications all the observations are in fact controls. Columns 4 to 6 report the analogous 
exercise where the policy border has been moved to the south, which implies that all 
municipalities are in fact treated. Only one of the 24 estimates is significant at the 5 percent level, 
indicating that test size is reasonable. 
 
Panel data estimates: The analysis of baseline municipality characteristics ( 81′ix ) indicated that 
population size and the share of temporary agricultural workers do not evolve smoothly at the 
SIPTEA border. Furthermore, the results in Table 3 show that the inclusion of these controls 
affects policy estimates on mobility. Hence, it might be that other variables that we do not 
observe (and that are discontinuous at the border) might also be confounding our estimates of 
interest. To address this concern, we resort to panel data models. Specifically, we use the 1981 
Population and Housing Census and compute the population growth, the probability of staying 
and the in-migration rate for the period 1970 to 1981. Using a pool of 1970-81 and 1981-91 
observations, we differentiate equations (3) and (4) to obtain the ‘difference-in-differences’ 
models that are robust to time-invariant municipality factors affecting mobility and 
unemployment. Specifically: 
iiiiiit εΔδ)xx(SIPTEAΔβyy +′−′+⋅=− 708181−7091−81       with dbdbi ≤        (7) 
iiiiii υΔλ)zz(SIPTEAΔφuu +′−′+⋅=− 81918191                  with dbdbi ≤        (8) 
Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) propose an alternative model that assumes 
unconfoundedness given lagged outcomes. The model is obtained by introducing the dependent 
variable of the first period as a right-hand side variable in equations (7) and (8): 
iiiiiiit εΔyψδ)xx(SIPTEAΔβyy +⋅+′−′+⋅=− 81−70708181−7091−81      with dbdbi ≤       (9) 
iiiiiii υΔuξλ)zz(SIPTEAΔφuu +⋅+′−′+⋅=− 8181918191                     with dbdbi ≤       (10) 
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Note that the introduction of the pre-treatment outcome as a right-hand side variable 
introduces a correlation between this regressor and the error term. Nevertheless, making treated 
and control observations comparable on pre-treatment outcomes can make the estimates of 
interest more credible. In fact, Imbens and Wooldridge conclude that the second model is more 
attractive in practice. We report the results of the two models in Table 4. Columns 1 to 3 show 
the ‘difference-in-differences’ for the 15, 20 and 25 km bandwidths, respectively. The remaining 
three columns show the corresponding results for the ‘unconfoundedness’ approach. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The results of the ‘difference-in-differences’ and the ‘unconfoundedness’ approaches are quite 
similar. In turn, these estimates are similar in sign and magnitude to the cross-sectional estimates 
of Table 3 although, for population growth and the probability of staying outcomes, the panel 
data estimates are somewhat larger (in absolute values) than the cross-sectional results. Focusing 
on the ‘unconfoundedness’ model for the 20-km bandwidth, the estimates imply that SIPTEA 
increased the population growth rate and the probability of staying by 3.7 and 3.1 percentage 
points, respectively. Unfortunately, and due to data restrictions, the analyses below are based on 
cross-sectional data on mobility (1981-91) and unemployment (1991). In the remaining analyses, 
we introduce the controls described above as this should bring us closer to the causal effects of 
interest. In this respect, it is reassuring that the cross-sectional results in Table 3 and the panel 
data estimates in Table 4 are similar, suggesting that the biases attributable to omitted (time-
invariant) variables in these cross-sectional exercises might not be very large.  
 
Cross-border migration: For the US, McKinnish (2007) has documented that welfare migration is 
most likely among individuals living close to state borders where the discontinuities in welfare 
generosity are most marked. In order to test if SIPTEA’s effect on in-migration is explained by 
short-distance moves, we decompose the policy effect on in-migration by the geographical origin 
of the inflow.  For each municipality, we know the number of 1981-91 in-migrants (aged 16 to 64 
in 1991) that came from each of the 17 Spanish regions (see panel A in Map 1). We consider 
three categories: (1) migrants from the contiguous region on the opposite side of the policy 
border, (2) migrants from other Spanish regions and (3) migrants from other municipalities 
within the municipality’s region. The in-migration rate for a given category is the number of 
individuals (aged 16 to 64) in 1991 in that category that were somewhere else in 1981, divided by 
the municipality population in 1981. The results are reported in Table 5. 
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 [Insert Table 5 here] 
The results indicate that SIPTEA attracted 0.25 cross-border in-migrants in the 1981-91 
period per 100 individuals in the destination municipality in 1981. This effect is small if we 
consider that the policy attracted 1.4 in-migrants when all origins are taken into account (see 
Table 3). This result is in line with McKinnish’s finding that welfare cross-border migration exists 
but is of limited importance. In our case, the largest inflows of in-migrants originated in non-
border regions. Between the end of the 1950s and the early 1970s, there were huge inter-regional 
flows of migrations in the direction of the more prosperous regions, especially Catalunya, Madrid 
and the Basque Country. As such, our results suggest that SIPTEA might have caused some 
‘welfare-induced’ return migration.  
The estimates in Table 5 have important implications as regards the interpretation and 
external validity of our exercise. With (short-distance) cross-border migration, an individual 
registered as an in-migrant in a treated municipality is an out-migrant in a control municipality. 
Hence, short-distance migrations across the border might explain the discontinuity in both the 
probability of stay and the in-migration rate. This would imply that policy estimates at the border 
tend to overestimate the policy effects in interior municipalities. Since the bulk of the effect on 
in-migration is not driven by (short-distance) cross-border migration, our mobility estimates can 
reasonably be generalized to the interior municipalities of these lagging regions.  
 
Mobility results by educational level: We now turn to the effects of SIPTEA on mobility for different 
levels of educational attainment. Specifically, we consider four groups: <5 years of education 
(including illiterates), 5 to 8 years of completed education (roughly corresponding to primary 
education), secondary education and tertiary education (more than 12 years of education). The 
probability of staying for a given educational group is defined as the number of individuals (aged 
16 to 64) in 1991 in that group that were in the municipality in 1981, divided by the population in 
1981. Likewise, the in-migration rate is the number of individuals (aged 16 to 64) in 1991 in that 
group that were somewhere else in 1981, divided by the municipality population in 1981. The 
results of these decompositions are shown in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
If we start with the probability of staying, our results in panel A indicate that the effect of 
SIPTEA on out-migration is driven by the behavior of individuals within the lowest educational 
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group (<5 years of schooling). In fact, the effects for the remaining educational categories are 
statistically insignificant. As for the in-migration rate, and focusing on the 20-km bandwidth 
results, the policy brought in 0.59 migrants with <5 years of education per 100 inhabitants in 
1981 whereas these figures were 0.62, 0.11 and 0.09 for the 5 to 8 years of schooling, secondary 
and tertiary education groups. Hence, the policy seems to have attracted a similar amount of in-
migrants from the two lowest educational groups. Notice that these demographic groups might 
differ in size and mobility. If the effect is measured in terms of the variables’ mean, it is much 
larger for the category with <5 years of schooling (0.48) than it is for the remaining categories 
(0.20 for the group with 5 to 8 years of education and 0.13 and 0.17 for those with secondary and 
tertiary education, respectively). Panel C reports the policy effect on the share of in-migrants with 
<5 years of education and reveals that the share increases by about 5 percentage points. Overall, 
the results in Table 6 are reassuring since they indicate that the effects of SIPTEA have been 
more marked for the group with the lowest educational level and, thus, the group of people that 
are more likely to be receiving unemployment benefits.  
 
Further results regarding unemployment: To determine whether in-migration of welfare prone 
individuals might partly explain the unemployment rate discontinuity at the SIPTEA border, 
panel A in Table 7 reports the unemployment rate estimates for ‘stayers’ and in-migrants, 
respectively. The unemployment rate increases discontinuously at the border for both groups, the 
effect being slightly larger for ‘stayers’ than for in-migrants. Hence, ‘importing the poor’ does not 
seem to explain the increase in unemployment observed at the border. The results in Table 7 
suggest that SIPTEA had stronger mobility effects on the less-educated and, thus, the 
unemployment change at the SIPTEA border could be the result of sorting by skills. In panel B, 
we first report the estimates on the unemployment rate including dummies for the shares of the 
working-age population in each of the four educational groups described above. Then, we show 
the results of a similar exercise where we hold the shares of the municipal labor force in 18 
different occupations fixed. Controlling for the educational level of the working-age population 
in the municipality leaves the estimated effect of SIPTEA on unemployment virtually unaffected. 
By contrast, including the share of the labor force in narrowly defined occupations reduces the 
estimated effect by 41 percent. This result suggests that one channel through which 
unemployment benefits increase unemployment is by reducing the mobility of workers from high 
to low unemployment occupations. 
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[Insert Table 7 here] 
Panel C in Table 7 shows the unemployment results for males and females. Here, we 
define the unemployment rate as the number of unemployed individuals over the relevant 
working age population. This definition, while reducing unemployment rates, has the advantage 
that it can be decomposed between employment and participation rates15. The results indicate 
that the effect of SIPTEA on unemployment is slightly greater for males than it is for females. 
The 20-km bandwidth results imply unemployment rate increases of 9.26 and 7 percentage points 
for males and females, respectively. Interestingly, the mechanisms driving these unemployment 
effects vary starkly form men to women. While the increase in unemployment is caused by a 
reduction in the employment rate for males, an increase in the participation rate fully explains the 
increased unemployment among females. 
 
6. Summary and concluding remarks 
SIPTEA is a national policy providing higher unemployment benefits to the residents of 
Andalucía and Extremadura, two lagging regions in the south of Spain. Using a border 
identification strategy, we have estimated the unintended effects of this large place-based policy 
on mobility. Specifically, we have estimated the effects of SIPTEA on population growth, the 
probability of staying and in-migration in rural municipalities experiencing high unemployment 
and significant migration outflows. Our results indicate that the policy under analysis reduced 
out-migration and increased in-migration, thus reducing population losses. These results are not 
explained by short-distance flows of migrants across the SIPTEA border and, hence, can be 
generalized to the interior of these lagging regions. The effects of the policy are more marked 
among individuals with the lowest level of educational attainment and, thus, those that are more 
likely to be recipients of unemployment benefit. Moreover, our panel data estimates show that 
these results are not driven by the presence of time-invariant factors affecting migration. 
Quantitatively, our estimates imply that SIPTEA increased the average municipal population 
growth rate by 3 percentage points between 1981 and 1991. Given that the municipalities lost an 
average of 15 percent of their population over this period, we can conclude that the effects 
recorded on mobility are modest. As such, it does not seem that the place-based policy analyzed 
here has given rise to very large locational inefficiencies.  
                                                 
15 If U, E, L and P stand for unemployed, employed, labor force and population, the unemployment rate is 
U/P, the employment rate is E/P and the participation rate is L/P. Hence, U/P= E/P-L/P since 
L=U+E. 
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We have also explored the unintended effects of SIPTEA on labor market outcomes. 
Our estimates indicate that the program has increased unemployment by 10- to 13-percentage 
points and, thus, the implied distortions are large. Since workers with income above the 
minimum wage are not entitled to the Agrarian unemployment benefit, incentives to work 
informally may have increased. Coupled with the self-reported nature of the unemployment data 
used, we might be overestimating labor market responses to the policy. Hence, an overall 
evaluation of SIPTEA would depend on the extent to which the increase in unemployment 
reflects actual behavioral responses. 
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Table 1. Unemployment benefits in ‘border’ Spanish regions and provinces in 1991. 
Region 
Recipients per unemployed 
UI (1) UA (2) Agrarian UB (3)  (2+3) (1+2+3) 
‘Border’ regions 
Treated 0.148 0.209 0.322 0.531 0.679 
Untreated 0.215 0.228 -.- 0.228 0.443 
‘Border’ provinces 
Treated 0.152 0.230 0.407 0.636 0.788 
Untreated 0.221 0.257 -.- 0.257 0.478 
Source: Anuario de Estadísticas Laborales 1991. Notes: Figures are number of recipients over unemployed 
individuals aged 16 to 64 (Labor Force Survey figure). Treated regions are Extremadura and Andalucía while 
neighboring regions are Castilla-León, Castilla-la Mancha and Región de Murcia. Treated provinces are Cáceres 
and Badajoz (Extremadura) and Córdoba, Jaén, Granada and Almería (Andalucía) while untreated border 
provinces are Salamanca and Ávila (Castilla-León), Ciudad Real, Toledo and Albacete (Castilla-la Mancha) and 
Murcia (Región de Murcia). 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (municipalities within 20 km of the border; N=236). 
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
SIPTEA 0.398  0 1 
Population growth, 1981-91 (%) -15.496 12.692 -57.778 20.368 
Probability of staying, 1981-91 48.082 8.091 21.875 64.622 
In-migration rate, 1981-91 5.781 3.185 0 15.868 
Unemployment rate, 1991 (%) 24.256 14.486 0 81.429 
Individuals with <5 years of schooling, 1991 (%) 33.824 18.154 0 80.562 
Individuals with 5 to 8 years of schooling, 1991 (%) 52.731 17.686 13.583 92.308 
Individuals with secondary education, 1991 (%) 9.773 4.080 2.222 25.926 
Individuals with tertiary education, 1991 (%) 3.672 2.239 0 13.333 
Ruggedness (logged) 3.482 0.570 1.579 4.591 
Agricultural employment per 100 inhabitants, 1982 15.748 9.009 0.037 57.568 
Industrial employment per 100 inhabitants, 1980 1.851 2.604 0 22.500 
Services employment per 100 inhabitants, 1980 6.104 3.017 0.978 22.813 
Unemployment rate, 1981 (%) 13.591 13.911 0 91.270 
Share of land on estates with >200 ha, 1982 (%) 0.532 0.278 0 0.973 
Share of temporary work in agriculture, 1982 (%) 13.741 16.187 0 85.765 
Population in 1981 1,943.0 5,188 45 60,627 
Notes: Data sources and definitions as in the text.  
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Table 3. The effects of SIPTEA on mobility 1981-91 and on the 1991 
unemployment rate. 
 
<15km <20km <25km  
A: Population growth 1981-91 
 4.274** 2.346 5.151*** 2.786** 5.646*** 3.230** 
(1.733) (1.586) (1.548) (1.409) (1.356) (1.325) 
B: Probability of staying 1981-91 
 2.622** 1.299 4.048*** 1.987* 4.273*** 2.048* 
(1.147) (1.211) (1.031) (1.100) (0.950) (1.102) 
C: In-migration rate 1981-91 
 1.493*** 1.527*** 1.316*** 1.406*** 1.971*** 2.412*** 
(0.454) (0.467) (0.415) (0.430) (0.497) (0.627) 
D: Unemployment rate in 1991 
 14.051*** 13.253*** 14.790*** 13.233*** 16.378*** 14.697*** 
(2.032) (1.954) (1.878) (1.887) (1.562) (1.575) 
Control variables  √  √  √ 
N 184 236 306 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10%. 
All specifications include regional border fixed effects. In panels A to C, control variables include 
terrain ruggedness, agricultural employment per 100 inhabitants in 1982, the employment levels in 
the industrial and services sectors per 100 inhabitants in 1980, the unemployment rate in 1981, the 
proportion of agricultural land on estates with >200 ha in 1982, the share of agricultural employment 
in temporary jobs in 1982 and the (logged) population level in 1981. In panel D, control variables are 
the (logged) ruggedness of terrain, agricultural employment per 100 inhabitants in 1989, the share of 
agricultural employment in temporary jobs in 1989, the employment levels in the industrial and 
services sectors per 100 inhabitants in 1990 and the (logged) population level in 1991. 
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Table 4. The effects of SIPTEA on mobility and unemployment. Panel data estimates. 
 
Differences-in-Differences Unconfoundedness approach 
 
<15km <20km <25km <15km <20km <25km 
A: Population growth 1981-91 
 3.216* 3.669** 4.315*** 3.270* 3.731** 4.364*** 
(1.690) (1.522) (1.369) (1.724) (1.560) (1.390) 
B: Probability to stay 1981-91 
 2.282 3.198** 3.317** 2.120* 3.121*** 3.220*** 
(1.544) (1.400) (1.295) (1.148) (1.038) (0.975) 
C: In-migration rate 1981-91 
 1.064** 0.502 0.930* 1.327*** 1.024** 1.557*** 
(0.493) (0.487) (0.539) (0.430) (0.402) (0.511) 
D: Unemployment rate in 1991 
 12.167*** 10.830*** 12.247*** 13.000*** 12.869*** 14.585*** 
(2.312) (2.050) (1.765) (1.838) (1.711) (1.466) 
N 184 236 306 184 236 306 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10%.  
Columns 1-3 are estimates of equations (7) and (8) whereas columns 4-6 correspond to equations (9) 
and (10). All regressions include time dummies interacted with regional border dummies. In panels A to 
C the vector x contains the logged population level and the employment levels in the industrial and 
services sectors per 100 inhabitants in the base year. In panel D, z contains the contemporaneous 
(logged) population level, the employment levels in the agricultural, industrial and services sectors per 
100 inhabitants and the share of agricultural employment in temporary jobs. 
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Table 5. The effects of SIPTEA on the in-migration rate 1981-91 by the 
geographic origin of the inflow. 
 
<15km <20km <25km  
A: In-migration rate 1981-91, cross-border regions 
 0.252** 0.250** 0.257*** 
(0.128) (0.112) (0.091) 
B: In-migration rate 1981-91, other-regions 
 1.006*** 0.949*** 1.140*** 
(0.325) (0.299) (0.298) 
C: In-migration rate 1981-91, same region 
 0.283 0.215 0.979** 
(0.201) (0.189) (0.465) 
N 184 236 306 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10%. 
These regression results correspond to specifications with the control variables identified in Table 3. 
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Table 6. The effect of SIPTEA on the probability of staying and the in-
migration rate by level of education. 
 
<15km <20km <25km 
A: Probability of staying 1981-91 by educational level 
<5 years of schooling 
 2.790** 3.027** 3.847*** 
(1.255) (1.171) (1.080) 
5 to 8 years of schooling 
 -1.810 -1.360 -2.159** 
(1.283) (1.183) (1.063) 
Secondary education 
 0.165 0.166 0.197 
 (0.273) (0.263) (0.229) 
Tertiary education 
 0.154 0.154 0.163 
(0.134) (0.123) (0.114) 
B: In-migration rate 1981-91 by educational level 
<5 years of schooling 
 0.581*** 0.587*** 0.956*** 
(0.200) (0.181) (0.243) 
5 to 8 years of schooling 
 0.646** 0.617** 1.044*** 
(0.279) (0.258) (0.311) 
Secondary education 
 0.196** 0.109 0.283** 
(0.091) (0.088) (0.109) 
Tertiary education 
 0.104* 0.093 0.128** 
(0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
C: Share of in-migrants 1981-91 with < 5 years of education 
 4.016** 4.726*** 5.864*** 
(1.969) (1.798) (1.658) 
N 184 236 306 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10%. 
These regression results correspond to specifications with the control variables identified in Table 
3. 
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Table 7. The effects of SIPTEA on unemployment, employment and 
participation rates in 1991. 
 
<15km <20km <25km  
A: Unemployment rate for ‘stayers’ and ‘in-migrants’  
Stayers 
 13.269*** 13.283*** 14.932*** 
(2.034) (1.950) (1.628) 
In-migrants 
 10.475*** 11.218*** 11.989*** 
(2.450) (2.264) (2.066) 
B: Unemployment rate with educational and occupational group dummies 
Dummies for educational groups 
 12.941*** 12.878*** 14.212*** 
(1.947) (1.902) (1.593) 
Dummies for occupational groups 
 7.473*** 7.693*** 8.724*** 
(2.295) (1.996) (1.741) 
C: Unemployment, employment and participation rates for men and women1 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Unemployment rate 
 9.002*** 7.007*** 9.256*** 7.003*** 10.365*** 7.244*** 
(1.610) (1.099) (1.529) (1.046) (1.270) (0.943) 
Participation rate 
 -1.105 7.296*** -0.878 7.138*** -1.123 7.019*** 
(0.817) (1.766) (0.747) (1.669) (0.699) (1.472) 
Employment rate 
 -10.107*** 0.289 -10.134*** 0.135 -11.488*** -0.225 
(1.747) (1.138) (1.652) (1.094) (1.433) (0.930) 
N 184 236 306 
Notes: 1 Unemployment rate in panel C defined as unemployed over population aged 16 to 64. 
Employment rate defined as employed over population aged 16 to 64 and participation rate as 
(employed+unemployed) over population aged 16 to 64. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, ** and * statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10%. These regression results correspond to 
specifications with the control variables identified in Table 3. Panel B further includes dummies 
for the share of the population aged 16 to 64 in four educational categories (first row) and in 18 
occupation categories (second row). 
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Graph 1. Number of workers on the Empleo Comunitario (EC) scheme and number of 
recipients of the Agrarian Unemployment Benefit (Agrarian UB), 1979-2000. 
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Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales and González (1990). 
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Graph 2. Number of employees in the Empleo Comunitario (EC) scheme, recipients of the 
Agrarian unemployment benefit (Agrarian UB) and unemployment rates (U), 1977-1995.  
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Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales, González (1990) and Labor Force Survey (EPA). 
Unemployment rates (U) in treated (Extremadura and Andalucía) and neighboring regions (Castilla-
León, Castilla-la Mancha and Región de Murcia) are annual averages of quarterly Labor Force Survey 
unemployment rates.  
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Graph 3. Population growth, probability of staying and in-migration rate 1981-91, 
and the unemployment rate in 1991. 
-2
0
-1
0
0
10
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
-200 -100 0 100 200
A: Population growth 1981-91
45
50
55
60
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 s
ta
yi
ng
-200 -100 0 100 200
B: Probability of staying 1981-91
5
10
15
In
-m
ig
ra
tio
n 
ra
te
-200 -100 0 100 200
C: In-migration 1981-91
10
20
30
40
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e
-200 -100 0 100 200
D: Unemployment in 1991
 
Notes: The horizontal axis is the distance to the border, with treated municipalities being 
assigned positive values. The dots are averages for rank percentile bins, each representing 
40 observations, while the solid lines are local linear regression fits estimated separately on 
either side of the border. The sources of the variables and their definitions are given in the 
text.  
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Graph 4. Baseline municipality characteristics in 1981. 
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Notes: The horizontal axis is the distance to the border, with treated municipalities being assigned 
positive values. The dots are averages for rank percentile bins, each representing 40 observations, 
while the solid lines are local linear regression fits estimated separately on either side of the 
border. The sources of the variables and their definitions are given in the text. 
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Map 1. SIPTEA regional implementation and ‘border’ municipalities. 
Extremadura
Andalucía
Castilla-León
Castilla-la Mancha
Catalunya
Madrid
Murcia
A: Regions in Spain
B: Provinces at the border
C: Municipalities within 20 km of the border
 
Notes: From left to right in panel B, the provinces that are contiguous to the SIPTEA border are Cáceres, 
Badajoz, Córdoba, Jaén, Granada and Almería (treated areas in dark grey) and Salamanca, Ávila, Toledo, Ciudad 
Real, Albacete and Murcia (control areas in light grey). There are 1,801 municipalities in these 12 provinces. 
Within these provinces, 236 municipalities lie within 20 km of the border (Panel C).  
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Annex 
 
Table A1. The effects of SIPTEA on mobility 1981-91 and on the 1991 
unemployment rate. Placebo estimates. 
 Border shifted to the north by Border shifted to the south by 
15km 20km 25km 15km 20km 25km 
A: Population growth 1981-91 
 -1.488 0.049 -0.940 2.419 2.376 -0.902 
(1.671) (1.493) (1.421) (2.114) (2.809) (1.965) 
B: Probability of staying 1981-91 
 -0.257 -0.668 -0.815 1.361 -0.103 -0.838 
(1.028) (0.934) (0.921) (1.806) (1.572) (1.193) 
C: In-migration rate 1981-91 
 -0.069 0.439 -0.356 1.222 1.928 -0.391 
(0.430) (0.384) (0.370) (0.975) (1.213) (0.790) 
D: Unemployment rate in 1991 
 0.406 1.416 2.332** 3.490 3.207 -0.627 
(1.584) (1.209) (0.964) (2.837) (2.125) (1.805) 
Bandwidth ±15km ±20km ±25km ±15km ±20km ±25km 
N 212 281 365 145 200 242 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,** and * statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10%. 
These regression results correspond to specifications with the control variables identified in Table 3.  
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